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Abstract
Public procurement refers to the purchase by public sector entities—such as government
departments or local authorities—of Services, Goods, or Works. It accounts for a significant
share of OECD countries’ expenditures. However, while governments are expected to exe-
cute them as efficiently as possible, there is a lack of methodologies for an adequate com-
parison of procurement activity between institutions at different scales, which represents a
challenge for policymakers and academics. Here, we propose using methods borrowed
from urban scaling laws literature to study public procurement activity among 278 Portu-
guese municipalities between 2011 and 2018. We find that public procurement expenditure
scales sublinearly with population size, indicating an economy of scale for public spending
as cities increase their population size. Moreover, when looking at the municipal Scale-
Adjusted Indicators (the deviations from the scaling law) by contract categories—Works,
Goods, and Services—we are able to identify a richer local characterisation of municipalities
based on the similarity of procurement activity. These results make up a framework for
quantitatively studying local public expenditure by enabling policymakers a more appropri-
ate foundation for comparative analysis.
Introduction
Public procurement contracts—defined by the OECD as the purchase by governments and
state-owned enterprises of goods and services [1]—are an essential public sector instrument
allowing policymakers to push-forward inclusive socio-economic standards [2], promote
innovation and economic growth [3–5] policies effectively. Among OECD countries, public
procurement weighs, on average, 29% of all governmental expenditures [2] (14% among EU
countries [6]) and 12% of global OECD countries GDP. Moreover, given the relevance of the
economic activity of public procurement mechanisms, the European Commission has
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Data obtained from PORDATA portal is publicly
available. However, data sourced from INE data it
was obtained through a research protocol, thus is
not public and cannot be shared due to privacy
reasons. Researchers interested in analyzing such
established a common framework for public procurement aimed at ensuring equal treatment
and transparency, reduce fraud and corruption and remove legal administrative barriers to
participation in cross-border tenders [7]. Furthermore, data on public procurement contracts
should also constitute the basis for analytical frameworks that effectively evaluate the
effectiveness and impact of public sector activities at different scales and dimensions compara-
tively. However, few studies have explored adequate methodologies that account for non-line-
arities in spending dynamics or examined the inference potential in public procurement data
[8–10].
Here, we propose using methods borrowed from urban scaling laws literature, which are
rooted in statistical physics and complexity sciences, to characterize municipal public procure-
ment activity. Urban scaling laws [11–14] have been widely used across different disciplines to
describe the relationship between socio-economic indicators in relation to the size of popula-
tion agglomerates. The resulting literature prompted a revision of current urban planning
frameworks and comparative indicators [15] while leading researchers to look for universal
laws in cities and urban growth. In that sense, applying these methods to study public procure-
ment activity can, in our view, lead to a similar revision on the current frameworks to evaluate
regional public procurement policies and quantify their activity.
Urban scaling laws model the relationship between an indicator, Y, and the size (e.g., popu-
lation, area)—X—of a set of sectional units (e.g., cities or urban areas) as a power-law, that is
Y � aXb ð1Þ
where β is the scaling factor and α represents the natural baseline activity of a region [16, 17].
In the context of urban scaling laws, several indicators—such as water consumption, housing,
or jobs [18]—have been shown to follow a linear relationship (β = 1.0). However, the more
interesting cases are those in which Y exhibits a superlinear (β> 1) or sublinear (β< 1) rela-
tionship with X. Such cases identify particular indicators that either scale above (superlinear)
or below (sublinear) linear growth with increasing population size. superlinear behavior is
often observed in the regional economic output [19–25], energy consumption and pollution
[26–28], employment [29, 30] criminality [30–34], number of patents [25, 29, 33, 35], wages
[33], employment in R&D [33] and urbanized areas [29]. Examples of sublinear relationships
are found in the total length of road networks [21, 33] and power grids [36]. In other cases,
like supply networks, Y exhibits sub or superlinear behavior depending on the industry [36,
37], and voter turnout [38].
It should be noted that the present analysis at the municipality level is not directly compara-
ble with past works in urban scaling laws literature [39], which have focused on studying cities
from a functional perspective [12, 18, 40–42]. Instead, and due to the local scale nature of pro-
curement activities, we focus on the administrative boundaries of city governance in Portugal,
i.e., namely municipalities [43, 44]. Moreover, while past works explore how the population
size of a city impacts its function in different dimensions (e.g., human, cultural, and innovation
outputs but also industry prevalence and infrastructure costs), our study explores an adminis-
trative dimension of cities through public expenditure.
Municipalities constitute an interesting intersection between a regional unit of governance
and a population agglomerate [43, 44]. They are also units at which policy related questions to
procurement activity, in terms of sustainability goals and execution efficiency, are particularly
relevant [45–48]. In Portugal, Municipalities are a Local Administrative Unit [49], which form
the building blocks of the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) European
regional units representing the second-largest administrative division whose governance body
is elected by universal suffrage. They are also the administrative division with the most stable
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regional boundaries and upon which city governance responsibility falls. Thus being, a suitable
candidate to study the scaling behavior of procurement activity.
It is also worth emphasizing that the volume of procurement activity, at the municipality
level, is closely linked with the size of the local economy. That is, municipalities with larger
budgets, for instance, will spend proportionally more on public procurement contracts. Such a
relationship, which we show in the SI, exhibits a high correlation coefficient (around 0.86) and
thus opens the question of whether procurement data is but a proxy for the size of the econ-
omy. However, the study of procurement data at the municipal level, in and of itself, has inher-
ent value for several reasons: 1) it provides a more fine-grained categorization of the
expenditure dynamics of municipalities, as contracts detail the nature of the service being con-
tracted, both from the supply and demand side, offering detailed information about private
companies also, unlike budgetary data; 2) due to international agreements aimed at increasing
market efficiency and competitiveness (as is in the case of EU), they are standardized across
countries and thus provide a unique opportunity to compare regional activities—this circum-
stance is not possible with budgetary data [7]; 3) public procurement contracts also have
higher transparency than budgetary data, as the latter is often opaque with accounting proce-
dures that change according to national laws and are thus different across regions [50]. Fur-
thermore, budgetary data depends also on institutional constraints that vary over time and
oscillate with the political cycles [51]); 4) it is a dimension in which there is a high risk of
anomalies, fraud, and corruption, and as such, there is a need for the development of accurate
models of what constitutes an expected level of procurement activity and dynamics to identify
suspicious activities [52–54]; and 5) unlike budgets, which are not always consolidated, public
procurement data also provide us information about the expenditure dynamics of public com-
panies and inter-municipal companies.
We start with a description of the data sources and data pre-processing steps. Then, we
characterize municipality procurement activity from an urban scaling law perspective, show-
ing that procurement activity scales sublinearly with population size. We then use Scale-
Adjusted Indicators (measured as the deviations/residuals from the scaling laws, a measured
also known as SAMI in USL literature [11]) to quantify the differences in procurement activity
between different regions (groups of municipalities), but also to obtain a new regional charac-
terization of municipalities through their similarities in revealed procurement activity. We
conclude with final remarks and a discussion of future working directions.
Data
We used data on Portuguese public procurement contracts sourced from the open-access gov-
ernmental portal BASE (base.gov.pt). BASE is a public repository managed by the Instituto dos
Mercados Públicos, do Imobiliário e da Construção (IMPIC) and results from the efforts of the
Portuguese government to comply with European open data policies established in 2004 [55].
Since 2008 and by decree [56], public administration bodies have published their procurement
activity online through BASE [57].
The working data set comprises 930, 513 contracts issued between January 2009 and
December 2018. Each contract relates an issuer that acquires services/goods/works from a sup-
plier and contains information on the issue date; the value of the contract (in euros); category
of contract; and Fiscal Numbers of both the issuer and supplier. We analyzed contracts issued
by the 278 Municipalities that constitute mainland Portugal (municipalities in the Azores and
Madeira archipelagos have not been considered as they represent autonomous administrative
regions). Since municipalities can also constitute municipal firms (i.e., a municipality can be
the single shareholder of another firm), we aggregated all municipalities and respective child
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firms into a single entity. The aggregation was manually curated with support from the Annual
Financial Booklet of Portuguese Municipalities [58–60]. The pre-processing steps included:
1. Removing observations with contract values equal to or smaller than one;
2. Identifying the Fiscal Number of each Municipality to use them as a primary key;
3. Aggregating municipal firms to the parent Municipality;
4. Discarding all non-Municipality related procurement contracts;
5. The value of contracts that involved more than one municipality were split equally among
all participating municipalities (the issuers).
The final dataset comprises 310, 819 contracts totaling a value of 16.9 billion Euros. Fig 1A
shows the monthly number of contracts issued, while panel b) shows the total value of those
contracts. Through visual inspection, it is possible to identify a tendency for municipalities to
increase the number of procurement contracts issued in the months leading to elections (red
vertical lines in Fig 1A. However, the same does not necessarily translate into an increase in
expenditure. Fig 1C and 1D show the spatial distribution of the total number of contracts (Fig
1C) and the total value per municipality (Fig 1D).
Each procurement is associated with the category of contract it represents, which follows
the standard classification from the European Commission [7]: Work contracts designate con-
tracts whose execution and/or design include civil engineering works such as roads or sewage
plants; Goods contracts identify contracts that are associated with the purchase, lease, or rental
of products such as vehicles or computers; Service contracts involve all contracts that have as
an object the provision of services such as consultancy, training, or cleaning services. Hence,
we computed the total expenditure in procurement contracts per year for each municipality,
Fig 1. (A) Number of monthly procurement tenders issued between 2009 and 2019 by Portuguese municipalities. (B) Total value in euros derived from procurement,
monthly issued by Portuguese municipalities between 2009 and 2019. (A,B) Bars correspond to a month/year, and vertical red lines indicate Municipal elections held
nationwide. (C) Spatial distribution of the total number of issued procurement tenders by a municipality. (D) Spatial distribution of the total value spent in
procurement contracts per municipality between 2009 and 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g001
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as well as the total expenditure by procurement contract category. Moreover, since the annual
expenditure was rather noisy, we applied a sliding window technique (moving average) of
three years. In that sense, the procurement values at year t correspond to an average of the val-
ues from years t − 2, t − 1, and t. The reported noise can have multiple sources. For instance, a
municipality might have issued a procurement contract for the execution of construction in
one year that was reflected in the forthcoming annual budgets and thus decreased its construc-
tion activity in the following years.
Finally, we enriched the data set with additional indicators by municipality and year. From
Pordata [61] we sourced data on Social Integration Income; House Prices; Number of Public
Workers; Total Births; Number of Large Corporations; Number of Divorces; Amount of
Credit; Number of Medical Doctors; Number of Cultural Events Attendees; Imports and
Exports Volume; and Environment Expenses. While from INE [62] we sourced ATM With-
drawals, Municipal Property Tax, Volume of Business in Accommodation, Catering, and
Retail; Individual Gross Income; Average Salary of Full-Time Workers. We use these indica-
tors to provide a point of reference to the analysis of public procurement activity, while allow-
ing us to compare with previous urban scaling laws literature.
Results and discussion
Scaling laws of municipal procurement expenditure
We started by comparing the estimated scaling coefficients from municipal procurement activ-
ities with those estimated from an extensive set of socio-economic indicators (Fig 2A). The
coefficients were estimated independently for each year between 2011 and 2018. Fig 2A shows
the average coefficient (Y-Axis) per indicator (X-Axis) with error bars representing the stan-
dard deviation.
In general, the obtained scaling coefficients are inline with previous findings in the urban
scaling laws literature, thus supporting the choice of analysis at the municipality level. Namely,
a superlinear behavior was observed for the volume of imports (β = 2.05 ± 0.12) and exports (β
= 1.79 ± 0.10), number of medical doctors (β = 1.38 ± 0.01), the volume of business from retail
except for car sales (β = 1.21 ± 0.01), amount of credit (β = 1.21 ± 0.04), municipal property
tax collected (β = 1.19 ± 0.05), number of divorces (β = 1.18 ± 0.02), total volume of house
mortgages (β = 1.17 ± 0.02), volume of business from catering (β = 1.16 ± 0.03), number of
workers (β = 1.16 ± 0.01), number of births (β = 1.15 ± 0.02), ATM withdrawals (β =
1.14 ± 0.01), self-reported gross income (β = 1.10 ± 0.01), and reported crime (β = 1.08 ± 0.04).
Linear scaling was observed for total the volume of business from accommodation (β =
0.99 ± 0.05). Sublinear scaling was observed for energy consumption (β = 0.88 ± 0.006), social
integration income (β = 0.97 ± 0.03), environment expenses (β = 0.84 ± 0.06), number of large
corporations (β = 0.81 ± 0.04), number of cultural event attendees (β = 0.70 ± 0.13), number of
public workers (β = 0.70 ± 0.06), and house prices (β = 0.47 ± 0.02).
Fig 2B and 2C explore the results obtained from the total procurement expenses per munic-
ipality in more detail. Fig 2B shows the annual change in the scaling coefficient, which exhibits
an upward temporal trend. Light-colored points indicate scaling coefficients estimated when
considering all municipalities, while dark-colored ones only consider municipalities with a
population size larger than 104. Fig 2C shows a representative example of the scaling behavior
from the year 2018. The threshold was set to filter out low populated municipalities with small
procurement activity, and does not reflect any underlying administrative differences between
municipalities (we discuss the sensibility of our results to the choice of threshold more in detail
below). In that sense, Fig 2B and 2C show the impact of including (lighter color) or not includ-
ing (darker color) municipalities with a population lower than 104. In all cases, the coefficient
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shows a sublinear relationship between the total public procurement expenditure and popula-
tion size.
Scaling of procurement activity by contract category
Fig 3 extends the analysis done in Fig 2B and 2C to different procurement contract categories:
Services, Goods, and Works. Like in Fig 2, Light colors refer to the entire set of municipalities,
while darker colors represent the sample of municipalities with a population size larger than
104. Fig 3A–3C show the scaling relationships in the year of 2018 for all three categories of pro-
curement contracts. As with the results in Fig 2C, Goods and Works contracts show a sub-
linear scaling. In contrast, Services show an almost linear relationship but only if the most
populated municipalities are considered, and a sublinear relationship when the entire set is
analyzed.
Now, focusing on the coefficients obtained for the entire set of municipalities. Public pro-
curement contracts are, in general, associated with the costs of city governance: maintenance,
Fig 2. (A) Average scaling coefficients for multiple socio-economic metrics (dark) and all procurement expenses (red). Moreover, we also show the coefficients
obtained for the different categories of procurement contracts: works (blue), goods (yellow), and services (purple). Error bars indicate the standard deviations of
estimated coefficients for the different years. (B) shows the annual changes in the scaling coefficients for procurement activity. (C) exemplifies the identified
relationships between the procurement expenditure (euros) and population size for the year 2018. (B and C) results for municipalities with more than 104 residents are
highlighted in dark red, light red indicates the results obtained when considering all municipalities.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g002
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expansion, and functioning of public infrastructures. In other words, they correspond to infra-
structure costs. In that sense, the sublinear behavior is inline with past results from urban scal-
ing laws literature. Moreover, the sublinear behavior suggests that we are in presence of an
economy of scale. That is, larger municipalities only need to spend a fraction of the per capita
value spent by less populated municipalities in their functioning.
Fig 3D–3F show that, unlike the results in Fig 2B, the annual upward trend of the scaling
coefficient is absent in Goods and Works contracts (note that the slope coefficients estimates
in all trend lines are non-significant at a significance level of 10%). However, in the case of
Works contracts, these exhibit a transition, around 2014/16, between two seemingly stable
regimes, a behavior that contributes to understanding the upward trend identified in Fig 2B.
The transition observed in the Works contracts’ scaling coefficient implies that, after 2014/15,
Fig 3. Decomposition of the scaling factors evolution per procurement contract category. (A–C) Relationship between total procurement expenses, by category, in
2018. (D–E) Scaling coefficient per year for each contract category. (A–F) lighter colors indicate the analysis conducted on all Municipalities, darker colors on the
subset of municipalities with a population greater or equal to 104. (D–F) lines indicate the best linear model but should only serve as a guideline as they are not
statistically significant at p-value threshold of 0.1. (G–I) Robustness checks on the estimated scaling coefficients. Colored points show the estimated coefficient when
different population thresholds are applied (we do so by adding the least populated municipalities, from the left to the right side, to the sample). Error bars indicate the
standard deviation of the estimated scaling coefficient. The black line indicates the average coefficient from bootstrapping the estimation from X (with X from 3 to 275)
municipalities selected randomly with replacement, so municipalities could be considered more than once in each sample, and estimate the scaling coefficient of the
sample (dark shaded area show the 95% confidence interval). We repeated this procedure 1, 000 times for each value of X. The vertical dashed line indicates the point
at which added municipalities have a population lower than 104.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g003
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the most populated municipalities started to spend proportionally more than less populated
ones, albeit the persistence of a sublinearity character still means that less populated munici-
palities spend more on a per capita basis. But what can explain such an abrupt change in the
coefficients of the Works contracts?
Between 2013/15 several events took place that can help us better understand the context in
which the above-mentioned transition took place. Portugal left the Troika bailout program in
2014 [63]. The program is notorious for having introduced unpopular policies to control pub-
lic sector finances. Moreover, the period is marked by two nationwide elections—the munici-
pal elections of 2013 and the parliamentary elections in 2014—that lead to a shift in the
political landscape from center-right to center-left [64–66]. Arguably, such change could have
contributed to a shift in the philosophy of public investments. Economically, 2014 is marked
by an increase in private sector activity accompanied by a steady rise in tourism flows to Portu-
gal [67, 68]. Although contextually important, it is difficult to pin these events to the underly-
ing cause of the transition in the scaling coefficients of Works contracts. Instead, they help
explain the steady decline in procurement activity during the bailout program and the
observed rise afterward (see Fig 1A and 1B), as it became easier for public administration to
obtain funding.
However, a more significant event took place in 2014. A new municipal finances law, which
entered into practice on January 1st, 2014, tightened the ability of municipalities to contract
debt. Interestingly, at the time, it was widely speculated that the new law would put particular
pressure on small municipalities’ ability to finance their investments [69–73]. Naturally, such
uneven pressure could have led to the behaviour observed in Fig 3F: a decrease in the procure-
ment activity inversely proportional to the population size increases the slope of the relation-
ship. It is also reasonable to understand that such law would manifest particularly in some
contract categories rather than others: Works contracts are linked with construction projects
and public investment in infrastructure; while Goods and Services contracts are associated
with the regular functioning expenses of the municipality (e.g., engineering services, finance
and accounting services, training and development, furniture, IT equipment, books, vehicles,
medical supplies and other commodities) where cuts are less likely to occur.
We conclude this section by testing the robustness of the scaling coefficients by setting dif-
ferent population thresholds and by bootstrapping the coefficients’ estimation.
Fig 3G–3I explore the impact on the estimated scaling coefficient (Y-axis) by considering
only the nth (X-axis) most populated municipalities (colored points with error bars) or by con-
sidering a random sample of n (X-axis) municipalities (black curve) (results correspond to the
average from 500 independent samples. Each sample is done by first selecting a year at ran-
dom, and then n municipalities also at random). When performing a threshold by population
size, we observe three distinct regimes: First, when only the most populated municipalities are
considered (left-hand shaded area Fig 3G–3I), there is a high variance in the estimated scaling
coefficients; Second, an intermediate regime in which the coefficient remains stable to varia-
tions in the number of municipalities (center white area Fig 3G–3I); Third, a regime of linear
convergence of the coefficient (right-hand shaded area Fig 3G–3I). In the second and stable
regime we qualitatively observe the same relationship between the estimated coefficients of the
three categories of contracts: Services with a higher coefficient close to one while Works has
the lowest coefficient around 0.75. Also important to note, the threshold of 104 inhabitants is
located in the rightmost boundary of stable regime (x = 175, vertical dashed line). Moreover,
these regimes that appear when filtering the municipalities by population size are absent when
the coefficients are estimated by performing random samples of similar size, where we recover
the coefficient estimated from the entire set of municipalities (black curve in Fig 3G–3I).
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In summary, different population size thresholds can lead to differences in the estimated
coefficients of Services, Goods, and Works (see Fig 3D to 3I), yet, our results are robust and
unbiased to random samples of different sizes, meaning that the data points are equally distrib-
uted in the entire domain of analysis. Moreover, since our goal is to obtain a comprehensive
picture of the regional dynamics of Portuguese municipalities, one that is relevant to assess
policy implications of procurement activity, we focused the analysis on the entire set of
municipalities.
Municipal procurement Scale-Adjusted Indicators
One major challenge when developing a comparative analysis of regional units relates to how
an indicator scales along the dimension of analysis (e.g., region area, population size, etc.). For
instance, it is common to compare regions on a per capita basis. However, such comparison
relies on the implicit assumption that indicators scale linearly with population size, therefore
the estimators will be inconsistent under sub or superlinearity regimes, in which case out-
comes can suffer from increasing/decreasing returns with the population size. Since that is not
the case for most indicators, see Fig 2, we can end up with erroneous conclusions. In that
sense, urban scaling laws literature proposes using the residuals of each region from the spe-
cific scaling law as a reference model.
We follow by estimating the so-called Scale-Adjusted Indicators (SAI) [11, 34, 74] to quan-
tify deviations of each municipality procurement activity from the scaling reference model.





where Yi,t is the observed expenditure of municipality i on year t, and Y(Ni,t) is the predicted
value given the population size of such municipality. Unlike per capita indicators, the SAI are
dimensionless and independent of population size [11, 34, 74]. The SAI capture human and
social dynamics specific to a given place and time, allowing for a population-unbiased compar-
ison between regional administrative bodies. For instance, SAI have been used to identify clus-
ters of regions with similar activity patterns [11]. In our case, the SAI provide a quantitative
unit of comparison between municipalities in regards to how much their expenditure, in dif-
ferent categories of procurement contracts, deviates from what would be expected from a
municipality of a given dimension. Hence, allowing us to account for non-trivial effects due to
population agglomeration while being a more accurate of cross regional comparison than the
more traditional per-capita-based metrics.
Hence, a municipality exhibiting a positive SAI (> 0) in a particular procurement contract
category implies that it spends more than it would be expected for that category given its popu-
lation size. Likewise, a negative SAI (<0) means that a municipality spends less than it would
be expected given its population size. For instance, SAI can be used to compare municipalities
along the different categories of contracts and estimate their similarity in terms of procure-
ment activity patterns while controlling for differences in population size.
Fig 4 shows the distribution of SAI obtained for different categories of contracts for 2018
and the best fit Normal Distribution for the SAI estimated per year. In all but one case, SAI are
Normally Distributed. Moreover, the SAI are uncorrelated with population size and show no
heteroscedasticity.
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Regional divide
Over the past century, scholars have looked to characterize existing regional profiles Portugal
from either traditional and/or modern sociological considerations [75]. These profiles have
shaped much of the regional political debate in Portugal. They are commonly found at the cen-
ter of policies designed to mitigate the development gap between rural (impoverished and low
populated) and urban (more affluent and densely populated) areas. The two most popular divi-
sions/profiles we consider here, divide Portugal in North/South and Coastal/Interior regions
[75]. The North and South divide centers around historical and cultural differences between
regions that impacted their spatial organization differently [76]; while the Coastal and Interior
divide concerns a more modern rationale based on differences in economic development and
the ensuing migration patterns observed over the past century [75, 77–82]. In this section, we
compare these regional divisions of Portugal and characterize them according to the procure-
ment activities of the municipalities that make up each [11, 83]. In doing so we attempt to
answer the question of whether there are distinguishable procurement activity patterns
between Portuguese regional divisions.
Fig 4. Distributions of Scale-Adjusted Indicators (SAI). Bars show the distribution of SAIs for 2018; curves show the best fitted Normal Distribution to the SAI data
for each year. Except for the observations for one year and one category of contract (Goods in 2014) the hypothesis that SAI follow a normal distribution cannot be
disproved using the Cramér–von Mises criterion at the significance level of 5%. The map shapefile was sourced from www.dados.gov.pt.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g004
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To that end, and to test the validity of divisions discussed in the literature we grouped
municipalities according to whether they are located on the Coast/Interior or in the North/
South (it is noteworthy to mention that despite the heated sociological literature on the
regional divisions in Portugal, we did not find a generally agreed-upon definition of these
regional groups nor a pre-existing annotated dataset at the municipal level). We defined as
Coastal municipalities all those that have a coastline or enclaves of municipalities with a coast-
line, else they were categorized as Interior. Moreover, we used the coordinates of each munici-
pality city center as a point of reference to classify them as being in the North or South. In
particular, we classified as North the 140 municipalities whose city coordinates are the north-
ernmost; the remaining 138 were classified as being in the South. Fig 5C shows the classifica-
tion of each municipality.
Fig 5A compares the average SAI between North and South municipalities (Δ = SAINORTH
− SAISOUTH) and Fig 5B repeats the analysis between Coastal and Interior municipalities (Δ =
SAICOASTAL − SAIINTERIOR). The analysis of the differences in SAI are indicative of systematic
differences in the execution of public funds among groups, as such they allow us to identify
whether, for instance, a specific group tends to spend on average more in a particular category
of procurement contracts than the other. In other words, we are comparing differences in the
observed deviations. The differences in SAI between the regional groups—Northern/Southern
[84] or Coastal/Interior [81]—reveal that there are distinguishable differences between
regions. For instance, Northern municipalities tend to exhibit, in average, larger SAI in
Works, while Southern Municipalities are characterized by larger SAI in Services and Goods.
These patterns remain qualitatively the same over the years. Moreover, Coastal municipalities
tend to have larger SAI in Goods and Services procurement contracts, while Works contracts
have evolved from being larger in the Interior to reach parity since 2016. In the SI we show the
average procurement activity patterns for each of these regions.
Profiles of procurement activity
Despite the identified differences between North/South and Coastal/Interior, the spatial distri-
bution of SAI does not directly map into such regional groups (see Fig 5D–5F). Instead, they
exhibit a richer spatial distribution of procurement patterns, which often breaks geographical
proximity.
Using the SAI, we can identify alternative regional divisions grounded in the comparison
between procurement activity. In that sense, municipalities can be grouped according to their
matched procurement activity profiles. Here, and in order to exemplify it, we define a profile
as the combination of the SAI signs from each of the procurement contract categories: Goods;
Services; and Works. Then, each profile identifies whether a municipality presents positive/
negative deviations in expenditures of one, two, three, or none of the procurement categories.
Table 1 summarizes the possible profiles (in terms of the SAI signs in each category) and
their prevalence in a typical year. It shows that four profiles are particularly dominant (in
bold) exhibiting a prevalence larger than we would expect from a random association between
municipalities and profiles. These four profiles also account for approximately 66% of the
observations. The four dominant profiles can be summarized as follows: profile I includes
municipalities that exhibited positive SAI in works and with negative SAI in goods and ser-
vices; profile II includes municipalities with positive SAI in goods and services and negative
SAI in works, profile III considers municipalities with negative SAI in all three categories; and
finally profile IV considers municipalities with positive SAI in all categories. Fig 6B–6D, show
the average SAI of the municipalities for each contract category in each of the four profiles
plus the remaining municipalities not assigned to a profile (referred to as N.A.). These figures
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Fig 5. Annual differences in the Scaling-Adjusted Indicators between different groups of Portuguese municipalities. (A) Differences between North
and South. (B) Differences between Coastal and Interior. (C) Portuguese municipalities colored according to the groups to which they were assigned.
District capitals are indicated. (D–F) show the Scale-Adjusted Indicators of each municipality for each procurement contract category in the year 2018.
Minimum and maximum of the color range are set to the maximum absolute Scale-Adjusted Indicator observed. In (A) and (B) the shaded areas
correspond to the 95% confidence interval band of the difference between two independent samples with continuous outcomes. The map shapefile was
sourced from www.dados.gov.pt.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g005
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allow to compare profiles not only according to their signs but also their respective
magnitudes.
Fig 6A shows three examples of the spatial distribution of the four profiles under consider-
ation in 2011 (left), 2015 (middle), and 2018 (right). It shows that while in some cases munici-
palities exhibit the same profile during the entire time window, there are cases in which
municipalities undergo changes in their profile. Transitions between profiles are seemingly
not random; instead they seem to follow a specific structure, see S4 Table in S1 File, with some
transitions being more frequent than others. In particular, we found that transitions between
profiles in which only one SAI of the sign changes are more likely to occur. These suggests,
that the evolution in municipality procurement activity does not suffer dramatic changes, but
instead follows from changes in different categories.
Fig 6E–6G shows the temporal variations in the SAI for 5 municipalities that are representa-
tive of the range of population sizes in our sample (see S6 Fig in S1 File for all municipalities).
While in the vast majority of the cases variations are stable and remain constant, there are
instances in which variations occur around zero and cases in which there more abrupt varia-
tions, which are particularly evident in the Works category. Such variations in the Works can
be partly explained by the nature of such contracts, which often involve the execution of large
construction works that are less frequent and might have a periodicity larger than the level of
temporal aggregation analysed. Overall, given the small time-window of analysis we will not
deepen the study of municipality-level temporal variations of the SAI, as the current dataset
would not allow for generalizable conclusions. Instead, we discuss how the emergent distribu-
tion of profiles match with the previous regional divisions and their rationale. Hence, the ques-
tion being, can we identify common characteristics between municipalities that share similar
procurement activity patterns?
The groups of municipalities according to their procurement activity profile, largely break
the spatial homogeneity of the regional divisions studied above (North/South and Coastal/
Interior). Supporting the idea that such divisions do not translate well into the diversity of pro-
files from a procurement activity perspective. Profiling the groups enables to reveal common
patterns and similarities in governance within groups but also the differences between groups.
Municipalities associated with profiles I and II are characterized by geographical, political,
and industrial differences and project the archetypes discussed above along the North/South
divide. For instance, profile I is mainly concentrated in the North (dominated by an electoral
preference for center-right parties, see SI) and profile II in the center/south (dominated by left
Table 1. Summary of the prevalence of each of the eight possible procurement activity profiles. In bold, the profiles
with a high prevalence and which are discussed in more detail in the main text. Each profile is characterized by the sign
of the SAI in each of the procurement categories: Services; Goods; and Works. The prevalence corresponds to the frac-
tion of observations (i.e., fraction of municipalities) in such profile. The four identified profiles—I, II, III, and IV—
account for approximately 66% of the observations.
ID Profiles Prevalence
Services Goods Works
IV - + + 0.223
– - + + 0.103
– + - + 0.099
II + + - 0.125
I - - + 0.140
– - + - 0.062
– + - - 0.074
III - - - 0.172
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.t001
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and center-left political parties, see SI) [66]. These regions are also known to have different
industry structures [84]: The North being more manufacturing intensive, while the south is
more Agriculture intensive.
The two remaining groups unveil differences stemming from policy and financially related
constrains. Profile III comprises municipalities with a higher debt per capita than the average
(see SI), which helps explain the lower public procurement activity of this profile. In contrast,
profile IV comprises a set of municipalities that have been able to capture more funds from the
European Union on a per capita basis (see SI) while having relatively low debt. Thus, their abil-
ity to execute more procurement than expected in all categories of contracts is not surprising.
These findings may indicate the presence of self-reinforcing mechanisms (profiles I and II),
that is, by means of rooted cultural and context-specific patterns of public procurement activ-
ity. However, a more robust analysis of the factors underlying such differences is needed to
adequately identify the socio-cultural and political factors driving the prevalence of the differ-
ent procurement activity profiles. Moreover, clustering techniques aimed at grouping munici-
palities along the revealed SAI patterns and their temporal dynamics could provide a more
complete characterization of existing regional differences. Nevertheless, it is clear that SAI
Fig 6. Procurement activity profiles. (A) Spatial distribution of profiles in 2011, 2015, and 2018. Profile I (red)
concerns municipalities that exhibited positive SAI in works with negative SAI in goods and services; profile II (light
orange), includes municipalities with positive SAI in goods and services and negative SAI in works; profile III (blue)
and profile IV (green) represent municipalities with all SAI, respectively, negative and positive in the three
procurement categories. Municipalities not assigned (N.A.) to a profile are colored in dark gray. (B–D) Average scale
adjusted indicators (SAI) in each procurement category for the municipalities associated with each one of the four
highlighted procurement activity profiles. (E–G) Example of temporal evolution of the SAI for each procurement
category for five municipalities representative of the different population scales: Lisboa (105.7); Torres Vedras (104.89);
Vieira do Minho (104.08); cuba (103.67); Castelo de Vide (103.47).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260806.g006
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provides a significant dimension for the accurate identifications of regional (dis)similarities,
one that controls for differences in population size.
Conclusions
Having the correct methodology to perform a comparative regional analysis of procurement
activities is critical to evaluate the effectiveness of public policies and their socio-economic
consequences. However, it is a challenge to develop accurate measures when indicators do not
scale linearly with, for example, population size. Here, we proposed using methods borrowed
from urban scaling laws to analyze procurement activities among 278 Portuguese municipali-
ties by different contract categories.
We characterised the scaling coefficient of procurement activity and put it at a glance with
an array of other indicators (Fig 2). Municipal procurement activity tends to scale sublinearly
with population size, meaning that increasing the population size lowers the value spent per
capita in public contracts. Such behaviour is true for both the total value spent in public pro-
curement and among the different categories of contracts (Figs 2 and 3).
We observe an upward trend in the annual variation of the scaling coefficients. However,
we argue that such a trend is being modulated by the observed transition in the Works pro-
curement contracts that jumped from�0.7 to�0.85 between 2014/16. We link such transition
to several socio-political events that took place in Portugal but, more importantly, by a revision
of the municipal finances law that entered in practice in January 1st, 2014.
Finally, looking at the deviations from the scaling laws (the SAI), we compared differences
in the revealed procurement activity between regional groups of interest—North/South and
Coastal/Interior—and demonstrate the potential of using the SAI in the definition of new
groups based on their similarity in procurement activity. The showcased example focuses on
four groups of municipalities that present differences in procurement activity profiles. These
groups are also associated with differences in electorate political preferences and industrial
structures (profiles I and II), but also by different financial constrains (profile III reveals
indebted municipalities) or policy interventions (profile IV are revealed to have received
higher EU funds). We believe that these findings justify the potential of the current framework
for study procurement activity and open the doors for future research aimed at understanding
and comparing regional dynamics within and between countries.
Although previous works have analyzed procurement data [8], they have done so using rel-
atively smaller samples, which limited the investigation of universal governing patterns at any
level. Ongoing work looks at developing of a more robust model to understand the link
between public procurement activity at the regional level, and economic development. A chal-
lenge that requires identifying the appropriated indicators and the adequate model specifica-
tion [85]. Moreover, future research may also extend this analysis to more fine-grained of
contract category classifications (i.e., exploring the CPV classification) but also to other coun-
tries and regions, particularly European public procurement repositories. The latter would
allow us to validate the identified scaling relationships and reveal differences in behaviours
across countries with diverse administrative processes and cultural contexts.
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48. Pavel J, Sičáková-Beblavá E, et al. Do e-auctions really improve the efficiency of public procurement?
The case of the Slovak municipalities. Prague Economic Papers. 2013; 22(1):111–124. https://doi.org/
10.18267/j.pep.443
49. Eurostat. Local Administrative Units (LAU);. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/
local-administrative-units.
50. Martins P, Correia L. Determinantes dos desvios orçamentais nos municı́pios portugueses. Revista
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Contineltal. Finisterra. 1990; 25(49). https://doi.org/10.18055/Finis1931
78. Rees P, Carrilho MJ, João P, Durham H, Kupiszewski M. Internal Migration and Regional Population
Dynamics in Europe: Portugal Case Study. 1998; 98.
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